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Opening gaps
There were many anticipations creating this book. We start with the Second 
International Conference on Anticipation, held at Senate House in London 
2017, where we (Jamie Brassett and John O’Reilly) organized and delivered 
a curated discussion panel – though this is by no means the earliest encounter 
germane to this story. Anticipation took the form of an atmosphere in this 
1930s Art Deco building. Senate House was initiated by William Beveridge 
when he was elected to the post of Vice-Chancellor of the University of 
London in 1926. Beveridge’s work anticipated and therefore created a new 
timeline of the future as the thinker of the welfare state that enabled heterog-
enous futures. Beveridge also had a different, more homogenous version of the 
future – like many of the pre-war left in Britain who were motivated by the 
idea of eugenics, the engineering out of undesired genetic qualities (Freedland, 
2012; Renwick, 2019). For Beveridge, the anticipatory power of the welfare 
state gave way to the predictive power of eugenics.
The 19-floor building of Senate House was designed by vegetarian Quaker 
Charles Holden, a specialist in the atmosphere of the subterranean, having 
designed over 40 underground stations in London. The slightly dystopic 
atmosphere generated by the severe beauty of the building’s Portland Stone 
materials haunted the future in the present in perfectly anticipatory fashion. 
George Orwell’s Ministry of Truth in Nineteen Eighty-Four was modelled on 
Senate House. The strategy of organizational threat as a mode of political con-
trol by Orwell’s Ministry of Truth, anticipates the operational logic behind the 
strategies of the US and UK governments nearly 20 years after the fictional 
year of the book – especially with the War on Terror. ‘Fear is the anticipatory 
reality in the present of a threatening future,’ writes Brian Massumi in his essay 
‘The future birth of the affective fact’. He continues: ‘It is the felt reality of the 
nonexistent, loomingly present as the affective fact of the matter’ (Massumi, 
2010, p. 54). In everyday experience such prophecies can become self-fulfill-
ing, but this disguises the affective, material power of threat as an atmosphere. 
The affective fact, Massumi argues, opens the way to generate and legitimate 
many different kinds of actions, actors and their networks to pre-empt the 
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event they actualize as a threat. While Nineteen Eighty-Four is remembered as a 
future fiction of its written present experiences of totalitarian government, of 
systemic lying as a strategy, of war as a mode of being, it is a story about love 
and its anticipation; a story taken up by Jamie in his chapter.
There were other futures anticipated by Senate House; the most globally 
affective one is that of Gotham City. Batman Begins (Nolan, 2005) and The 
Dark Knight Rises (Nolan, 2012) make use of Senate House in their vision of 
Gotham. A city whose urban planning mostly consists of the creative act and 
atmosphere of chiaroscuro, from the bat signal to the shadows from which the 
hero emerges. Nolan’s vision – about the breakdown of urban government, 
the anger of citizens finding expression in populist forms and autocracy – sug-
gest perhaps that Senate House’s architecture was in fact plagiarized from the 
future (as Derek Hales might say, in his pataphysical way, in this book’s last 
chapter).
Our panel at Anticipation 2017 comprised four writers in this collection 
– Mark Donoghue, Anne Marchais-Roubelat, Fabrice Roubelat and John 
O’Reilly – with Jamie Brassett acting as chair. The panel also included Bettina 
Bouchayer who co-presented with Anne but who was unable to participate in 
this book. Its title, ‘Inserting the Future in the Crannies of the Present’, was 
a reference to a passage in philosopher, mathematician and physicist Alfred 
North Whitehead’s Adventures of Ideas (1967b). In Chapter Twelve, titled ‘Past, 
Present, Future’, he writes: ‘Immediate experience requires the insertion of 
the future in the crannies of the present’ (Whitehead, 1967b, p. 191). What 
was most striking for us about this is the tone, its style. Its brash confidence 
disguises profound implications through a spatialization of time. Through this 
we become capable of acting on the demand of time; a demand that antic-
ipates time because without this demand, this anticipation outside of time, 
there would be no time for time. Anticipation as the creation of time. (Both 
Marchais-Roubelat and O’Reilly deal with this.) Whitehead’s phrase struck us 
as an important precursor to more contemporary accounts of anticipation (to 
which we will refer later in this book), where the future is not only met but 
brought into the present as a creative act.
If anticipation is understood this way, the novelty it creates cannot be pre-
dicted simply by adding the given components. The panel inserted the future in 
the crannies of the present by creatively substituting expectation with anticipa-
tion. Moreover, the passage from Whitehead resonated with our understand-
ing and approach to design-intensive innovation (Lambert and Flood, 2018) 
and its management. We have wondered: if design contributes to, ‘immediate 
existence’ (or even wholly constructs it) then, at least, mapping and locating 
the possibilities for such existence to manifest itself is important act of creativ-
ity and futures thinking coming together (Brassett and O’Reilly, 2015, 2018a, 
b). Like this introduction, and the book itself, the mysterious landscape of the 
future described by Whitehead did not pre-fix the anticipations of the panel-
lists. Whitehead’s generous topography enabled different crevices to open in a 
specific present (that of a conference on anticipation), with creative potentials 
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for our participants to fill. Mark brought the ontologies of the picture space into 
a mix with the ecological psychology of J.J. Gibson; Fabrice spoke through the 
divinations of Plutarch; Anne and Bettina presented Heidegger’s conceptions 
of time in collision with specific forms of branding and marketing; and John 
the creative anticipation of Lucretius’s clinamen in relation to the innovation of 
tennis players and Napoleon Dynamite (2004). Our then-present required us to 
find and fill some crannies in which to place various, unexhaustive and non-
totalizing models of potential, possible, creative anticipation.
Here we are, some years later, having – at the very least – modelled various 
ways of working together: teaching, writing and practising. With that experi-
ence creating a space for diverse individuals and disciplines to collide and rico-
chet in many different directions. Furthermore, this experience has allowed us 
to develop a set of specific approaches to anticipation and the future which, 
while coalescing in a number of outcomes – the conference, this book, some 
journal articles and special issue editing – have refrained from homogenizing.
There is more. This book collects more than just those speakers from a 
specific panel at Anticipation 2 (2017). Some of our relationships are new to this 
book, others more long-standing. So here we have, in addition to those of us 
presenting in the Whiteheadian curated session at that conference: philosopher 
of the future and Ernst Bloch scholar, Nathaniel Barron; architect, philoso-
pher, digital design expert and innovation practitioner Derek Hales (whose 
chapter here has links with his presentation at the first Anticipation conference 
at the University of Trento, Italy, 2015); social design expert and pioneer of 
policy-focused design innovation, Lucy Kimbell (who ran another panel at 
Anticipation 2, with the stand-up comedian Trevor Locke). All our contribu-
tors, their thoughts, practices and other creative moments entangle at various 
points and spin off away from each other at others – we will note some of these 
when we discuss the chapters in a little more detail below.
If we think of anticipation as an activity partly fostered by pressure from 
the future (thinking of anticipation also as an ecology of time) we might want 
to think again of atmosphere, but this time also in meteorological terms. In 
‘Affective Atmospheres’, Ben Anderson (2009, p. 77) cites Marx’s address to a 
gathering celebrating the fourth anniversary of the Peoples’ Paper: ‘the atmos-
phere in which we live weighs upon everyone with a 20,000-pound force, but 
do you feel it? No more than European society before 1848 felt the revolution-
ary atmosphere enveloping and pressing it from all sides’ (Marx, 1978, p. 577). 
Atmospheres – even, or especially, those emanating from the future – argues 
Anderson, are produced by bodies (human, non-human, material, immaterial) 
but exceed them. There is something creative about the urge from the future 
that an atmosphere, felt as revolutionary, must exert on us. The atmospheres of 
this book began with the bodies of Senate House, our panel, the anticipation 
conference, meetings yet to come, all haunting of the future of this book – one 
time was anticipated in the moment of you reading this now. Other times got 
lost, haunting this book with other futures that may now be impossible. While 
another time had an atmosphere created by the bodies of COVID-19.
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But there is something that we need to note, to anticipate. For alongside the 
contextualization that we give of our completing the manuscript for this book 
as the time of the COVID-19 pandemic, another important event arose just 
before we submitted our manuscript: the killing of African American George 
Floyd by a white police officer. While the Black Lives Matter movement has 
been active for some years, and the issues it has coalesced around even longer, 
the protests and demonstrations galvanized throughout early 2020 by George 
Floyd’s killing have forced many to reflect upon their privileges. And so, as 
we have arrived at the end of producing this book, we are deeply aware of the 
whiteness of the voices we have collected. This was never our goal and there 
are many reasons why this book has arrived in this condition, but no excuses. 
We offer the story here, therefore, not to excuse ourselves, rather as a caution-
ary tale.
From signed contract to required submission the process was particularly 
short, we felt we had no time to send out an open call for chapters, work-
ing with the group we had gathered around the Anticipation conferences. 
Beginning with an equal balance of gender positions the group was impacted 
by colleagues unable to participate, while others we approached found the 
time constraints too tight. We are sure that this book provides a set of creative 
perspectives on anticipation and futures studies that we feel is exciting, but we 
nevertheless recognize that we would have liked to have more scholars who 
identify as non-typical within our academic sectors, including people of colour. 
It should be noted that the scholars collected here exist at the intersection of a 
number of non-typical heritages, classes, socio-economic abilities and cultural 
positionalities: ours are not wholly and entirely privileged voices. Furthermore, 
we have – deliberately – engaged with scholarship and practices that are activ-
ist or non-typical. A few examples are: O’Reilly’s examination of the activist, 
performative and theoretical work of Black Quantum Futurism and the Black 
Space Agency; Marchais-Roubelat’s discussion of the poetry and religion of 
ancient indigenous people of northern Europe in relation to futurist approaches 
to organizational studies; Hales also encounters Afrofuturism alongside outsider 
theorists and practitioners; Kimbell’s contextualization of her work in relation 
to age, gender, Alzheimer’s disease and dementia. Notwithstanding this, we 
editors are cognizant of our product’s partiality and that there are many other 
ways that our stories, concepts and practices could be told. We, Jamie and 
John, shall try to find the hope that is alive in the cracks and crannies of this 
work to create better futures; and therefore, to recombine new presents.
Inserting futures (with a creative philosophy)
Even in its recent development within futures studies, Anticipation has a rec-
ognizable characterization, which can be stated fairly simply: deceptively so. A 
system that anticipates is one that models a future, brings it into its present and 
bases decision-making upon this model. This modelling reorganizes the system 
and its present in such a way that one can say that the future is causing a present 
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state. This is at the heart of key progenitor of these studies, Robert Rosen 
(1934–1998): a theoretical, relational biologist and mathematician. His most 
important work in this area is Anticipatory Systems: Philosophical, Mathematical 
and Methodological Foundations (2012; first published 1985) and, in it, he and 
colleagues attest to the difficulties wrought on his career as a scientist by pro-
pounding and sticking with something as so patently, apparently, ridiculous as 
the future causing the present. This is what you will see in any book on this 
topic, especially in its guise in futures studies – which is the context for this 
volume.
The other key figure in the development of anticipation studies is philoso-
pher, futures scholar and thinker of complex systems, Roberto Poli. The scope 
of his work is astounding, which is manifest in his (2017) book, Introduction to 
Anticipation Studies. Poli is a figure with a significant presence in this volume, 
with explicit critical evaluations of his work in some chapters (Barron, Brassett, 
Brassett and O’Reilly, for example) and more lightly felt in others. Poli paves 
way for a philosophical approach to anticipation, which we follow in this book. 
His own philosophical interests and expertise, however, highlight some gaps in 
his mapping that we are pleased to explore given our various but aligning per-
spectives. Chief among these is the work of philosopher Gilles Deleuze, on his 
own and with his sometime co-writer psychoanalyst and political activist Félix 
Guattari.1 While Poli (2017, pp. 87–88) does make mention of Deleuze’s phi-
losophy – which comes as one of seven ‘philosophical samples’ (Poli, 2017, pp. 
78–88) in Chapter 5 ‘Anticipation in Philosophy’ – he is open about his own 
lack of acceptance of Deleuze’s positions. It is interesting – stylistically and, 
maybe, psychoanalytically – that Poli’s own voice is most personal and clear 
when writing of Deleuze. For example, he writes: ‘According to Deleuze, this 
virtual form of causation is categorically different from ordinary mechanical 
causation. I have to admit I fail to see why’ (Poli, 2017, p. 88; emphasis added). 
Now, of course, there is nothing at all wrong with such a statement; but, in this 
volume, there are many of us who seek to investigate aspects of Deleuze’s – and 
Deleuze and Guattari’s – philosophies that we find do offer insights into futures 
in general and anticipation studies in particular. This is not to say that Poli is 
therefore wrong in his analyses. Our approach is more open than that (and 
Brassett may say, in the terms put into play by his chapter in this volume, ‘sym-
pathetic’), an approach itself influenced by an insight from Deleuze (1995). In 
a 1986 interview about Foucault’s work – just two years after Foucault’s death 
and at the time that Deleuze (1988; originally 1986) published his book on his 
friend, titled simply, Foucault – titled ‘Breaking Things Open, Breaking Words 
Open’ (pp. 83–93), Deleuze (1995, p. 87) says this: ‘Never interpret; experi-
ence, experiment’. The urge not to interpret allows different interpretations to 
live together, for when the judgements it requires are not the most important 
act to deliver, then multiple interpretations can abound. That no one should be 
getting philosophically extremist about canon, is a valuable take away we have 
from the philosophies (and other attitudes: literature, psychoanalysis, politics, 
for example) that Deleuze and Guattari create.
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This leaves us with, ‘experience, experiment’ – on which the translator’s 
note says: ‘The single French verb expérimenter means at once to experience, 
and to experiment’ (Deleuze, 1995, p. 197, n. 13). This provides a different 
attitude to philosophy than the interpretative. Ours is a philosophy of making, 
doing, creating, living and is found joyfully expressed from Deleuze’s early 
work on Spinoza (1990b; originally published 1968) and Nietzsche (1983; 
originally published 1962) to the collaborations with Guattari (1984, 1988, 
1994). Philosophy makes, does things with the concepts it encounters and 
experiences. It experiments; it creates. This is carried even further in Deleuze 
and Guattari’s last book together, What is Philosophy? (1994; originally pub-
lished 1991) where they argue that philosophy can be characterized by its 
powers of concept creation. Thus, an important aspect of anticipation – that a 
model of the future is used to recreate the present – is also an aspect of philoso-
phy as we will be using it. This allows us to follow a tributary from the style of 
philosophy that Poli produces to another, one different to his, which – it is our 
hope – will offer something else in addition. Important here is the philosopher, 
scientist and philosopher of science Isabelle Stengers, for whom Deleuze and 
Guattari’s works are influential. In an essay on What is Philosophy? Stengers 
(2005, p. 152) writes the following:
It is his [Deleuze’s] one book that addresses its reader as if he were perhaps 
a friend, but at that twilight hour ‘when one distrusts even the friend,’ 
even the one who had most enthusiastically followed the great opening of 
possibilities that Deleuzian themes have inspired. Here, the crucial prob-
lem may well be that ‘we lack resistance to the present,’ [Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1994, p. 108] and to resist here does not mean to criticize or to 
denounce but to construct.
This is a passage that gestures towards Nietzsche in a way that we will in the 
chapter that follows this introduction, with further concepts taken up more 
fully in Brassett’s chapter. Still, for now, our own ‘resistance’ to Poli’s review 
of Deleuze’s work is a thoroughly constructive one. The passage from which 
Stengers quotes about resistance to the present is worth citing in full. Deleuze 
and Guattari (1994, p. 108) write:
we do not lack communication. On the contrary, we have too much of it. 
We lack creation. We lack resistance to the present. The creation of concepts 
in itself calls for a future form, for a new earth and a people yet to come. 
(Original emphasis.)
When resistance is creation, ‘resisting with concepts’ can be another way of 
saying ‘philosophy’; a philosophy that calls for a ‘people yet to come’ to come. 
A future can only be made to come here, to the present, if we open ourselves 
to the possibilities that we, here, now, our ‘immediate existence’, may be rec-
reated by the arrival of the ‘people yet to come’. Stengers is surely one who has 
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been a sympathetic friend of the ontological reconstruction on offer in Deleuze 
and Guattari’s work; she may even be the friend ‘who had most enthusiastically 
followed the great opening of possibilities that Deleuzian themes have inspired’ 
now distrusted or, at least, resisted. Indeed, their phrase ‘a free and wild crea-
tion of concepts’ – characteristic for them of ‘English Philosophy’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1994, p. 105) – ends up as a subtitle of her Thinking with Whitehead. A 
Free and Wild Creation of Concepts (2011; originally published 2002).
Stengers’s philosophy is an adventure, an exploratory and experiential voy-
age into the future in a way that brings the future back to hand. She writes, in 
an article on Whitehead’s 1927–28 work Process and Philosophy :
The adventure of the creation of a conceptual agency cannot be disen-
tangled from the experiential adventure of the philosopher experimenting 
disclosure. We can speak here of ‘experimenting’ because the disclosure is 
part of a process that can be described as conceptually ‘lured’. Each con-
cept has to be designed and redesigned, as the point is not of adequacy to 
some kind of pre-existent matter of fact but, rather, that of two questions 
which are always at work together: is the conceptual agency succeeding in 
doing what the philosopher wants it to do, and are those aims an adequate 
expression of the challenge she has decided to confront?
(Stengers, 2008, p. 97)
We can say that, in anticipation, a future is ‘lured’ to the present; with ‘lure’ 
in Stengers’s sense to work utterly in registers of adventure, speculation and 
experimentation. She writes: ‘For the value of concepts is to lure new feelings, 
to induce “sheer disclosure” as a new way for experience to come to matter’ 
(Stengers, 2008, p. 100). A lure is modelled on a future state where a thing 
to be caught will find it attractive and bites. If a concept is to ‘lure’ it is to be 
launched into all our presents as a future possibility that, once allowed in, can 
recreate experience, or even modify existence. It will be an adventure and an 
experiment; it will speculate and allure; it will resist and create. We return to 
Whitehead’s (1967b, p. 191), ‘[i]mmediate existence requires the insertion of 
the future in the crannies of the present’. This points in another, ontological, 
direction that is of importance to us in this book.2 Before we come to that, 
there is a little more to say about types of creativity.
Up till now we have directed our attention to two important pillars of 
this volume: philosophy and creativity; both of which have valuable links 
to anticipation, as well as with each other. Many of us in this volume have 
some sort of relationship to the creative industries and education (which often 
now coalesce as both creativity and education – along with government – 
become business as a function of neoliberalism. From a design perspective see: 
Julier, 2017). And at one point ‘design’ was going to be another pillar of this 
book. Indeed, some of us here refer to particular design practices (for example: 
Kimbell on textiles, printmaking and design fictions; Hales on architecture 
and speculative design; O’Reilly on design-intensive innovation education; 
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and Barron on design philosophy). The trajectories that each chapter takes, 
however, tend to accentuate the philosophical and creative, rather than a 
commonly discussed and recognized creative practice: like design. (Though, 
even to describe design as a ‘recognized creative practice’ is to stretch facts a 
little too far, as its ever-changing multiplicity is seen as problematic by some 
(Verganti, 2009) or a benefit (Brassett, 2015).) However, we do not provide 
a sustained interrogation of ‘design’ for it to warrant an important place as a 
focus for this book. Along with some exemplifications of our own concep-
tual experimenting of anticipation through design (as mentioned just above), 
we do refer to other forms of creative practice: textile design and painting 
(Kimbell, Donoghue); organizational design and design thinking as a busi-
ness practice (Marchais-Roubelat, O’Reilly, Roubelat); literature (Marchais-
Roubelat, Hales, Brassett); and, even, science (Brassett, Donoghue). So, the 
role of various creative practices is important here, too. Before positioning the 
chapters in more detail – but with greater emphasis on where some ideas put 
forward might lead – we will say a little more about a final, crucial aspect of 
this book.
As we parse a number of creative practices from a focus upon creativity, so 
do we highlight a particular aspect of philosophy: ontology – the philosophical 
questioning of being, often thought of as the asking and attempt at answering 
the question, ‘why is there something rather than nothing?’ Once again, we are 
guided here by Poli, who has specific articles on this (Poli, 2010a, 2011; Poli 
and Seibt, 2010) and who notes in Chapter 7, ‘Ontological Sketches’ of his 
Introduction to Anticipation Studies (2017, p. 103) that ‘ontology is the theory of 
entities and their structures’ that often involves, formally, ‘dealing with catego-
ries like thing, process, matter, form, whole, part, and number’ (Poli, 2017, p. 102; 
original emphases). We will not be arguing about ontology from first prin-
ciples, however, neither will we attempt to establish categories as those Poli 
mentions just above. We will be working with (experimenting and experienc-
ing) these ontological categories in the company of some philosophers who 
have developed key approaches to these (and more). You will find us discuss-
ing ‘thing’ with Latour (2008) or ‘process’ with Whitehead (1978), ‘wholes’ 
and ‘parts’ with Stengers (1997) or time with Heidegger (2007), many of 
which fold back and through the works of Deleuze and Guattari. Oftentimes, 
Poli examines these ontologies and categories through the works of Edmund 
Husserl (1859–1938), Nicolai Hartmann (1882–1950) and Ernst Bloch (1885–
1977). Such, respectively, phenomenologist, critical realist and Marxist criti-
cal theorist approaches take different directions from those we present here. 
Except for one: Nathaniel Barron. A Bloch scholar, he provides a critique of 
Poli’s approach to Bloch that allows him (Barron) to develop some important 
conclusions about the relationships between anticipation, ontology and crea-
tivity. For Barron, Poli is closer to Adorno (or even Kant) than Bloch, even 
while Bloch plays an important part in his (Poli’s) philosophy of anticipation. 
Barron states it is important that ‘if anticipation studies is concerned with the 
ontological reason for anticipation’s existence, then it should also understand 
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that that reason involves the question of goal’ (personal communication, with 
permission).
But we are running ahead of ourselves a little. Here are the main points to 
take, then: that our interaction with anticipation will be largely philosophical 
and then with a great focus upon ontology; we will use these to focus upon the 
conceptualization of creativity and its role in anticipation. Now we move to 
the chapters a little more closely.
Anticipating chapters
The framing and situating remarks for this book are done with and we will next 
look over the chapters themselves. Traditionally, editors would be expected to 
provide some summary of the individual chapters. We will do this minimally, 
as we are seeking neither to interpret nor to overpower our readers’ own inter-
pretative flourishes. Here we devote more space to following ‘lines of escape/
flight’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984, 1988) from these chapters in directions 
that are variously suggested to us, especially insofar as they approach issues of 
creative practice. To do this is to pick up some key concepts and run with 
them to see where they take us; to launch them into new areas and see what 
splashes they make; to insert them as cogs in different machines to see what is 
produced.
The discourse of the ‘spoiler’ in cinema is pertinent here: to spoil the plot, 
the narrative, the ending for those who have yet to see the film by those who 
have. Might this introduction be to the book what spoilers are to films: telling 
the reader what is to come, anticipating the readers’ reading, predicting and 
thereby owning the ‘best bits’ for the reader – we will come back to this notion 
of ‘best’ later. Corporate futurism is often, literally, spoiling. The future as the 
site of corporate concerns does not necessarily align with that characterized by 
the concerns of people in the future to come. Although such scenarios make it 
so, make people subject to corporate concerns. The originary myth of Shell’s 
scenario planning in the 1970s may have been wrapped up in the need to avoid 
another energy crisis, but they did not see the ecological catastrophe of the 
future-present they were creating.
We are not looking to spoil, though. Our recasting of this book’s origins 
we present as a tale of chances rather than one of authenticity. And our map-
ping of the chapters we hope is more to do with seeing what, else, might be of 
interest. In a way, each of the paragraphs below that discuss the chapters could 
be read immediately after the chapters themselves; maybe you can try it and 
head straight in now? This might allow us past any accusation of spoiling. But 
now, the chapters.
The nine chapters that follow in this book share concerns with anticipation, 
creativity and philosophy, however each paper anticipates the concept with a 
style of research that affirms its disciplinary concern with anticipation but also 
anticipates the novelty of anticipating with creativity and with the future of a 
discipline different, even while they align at moments.
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Picturing
Mark Donoghue’s chapter ‘Anticipation, creativity and picture perception’ has 
developed from research he has been carrying out on the ontology of picture 
spaces, with reference to the works of Deleuze, nineteenth-century Japanese 
artist Katsushika Hokusai (1760–1849) and ecological psychologist James 
Gibson (1904–1979). His chapter here focuses upon the logics of perception 
and the anticipatory ontology of picture spaces. In order to do this, Donoghue 
brings the philosophies of Henri Bergson (1859–1941) and William James 
(1842–1910) – especially their concepts of duration (la durée) and Pragmatism 
respectively – into collision with concepts from the Bayesian theory of prob-
ability. This, Donoghue readily recognizes, may seem like a paradoxical collec-
tion of concepts to bring together; that is, to imagine processes of prediction in 
relation to those of generation of novelty. He shows these paradoxes permeat-
ing both Bergson’s and James’s works and it is through their evaluation that 
Donoghue can begin to outline a future- and present-focused creativity. Thus, 
creativity is that which exceeds normal psychoneurological processes of prob-
ability calculation and predictive patterning, even while it finds a ground there. 
This provides Donoghue a position that not only develops from Bergson and 
James’s philosophies, but also brings it into proximity to the work of Deleuze; 
particularly Deleuze’s (1990a) The Logic of Sense, in the fifteenth chapter, ‘Of 
Singularities’ (pp. 117–125), where Deleuze navigates the different generating 
processes of persons, individuals, events and, of course, singularities. One of 
Deleuze’s concerns here is in the energetic modifications and modulations of 
the ontological process of becoming and, at one moment, he quotes philoso-
pher of technicity, Gilbert Simondon (1924–1989) thus: ‘The living lives at 
the limit of itself, on its limit’ ( Simondon, 1964, p. 260; quoted in Deleuze, 
1990a, p. 119). To live at the limit is to experience the limit and to experi-
ment with exceeding it; it is to spread outwards from a ground to (and over) 
the edges of experience. An ambitious piece of work, this chapter manages 
to engage our shared subject with a transdisciplinary and creative flair. We 
wonder how the arguments Donoghue gives here might fare in relation to the 
speculative and process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (who was well 
disposed to both James and Bergson), as well as the evolutionary biologist and 
philosopher C. Lloyd Morgan (whose work on Emergent Evolution (1927) dealt 
positively with James, Bergson and Whitehead). To recognize creativity as that 
which outpaces any simplistic analysis of parts in a reductive manner, aligns 
with the various positions we shall adopt throughout this book: particularly 
those on anticipation.
Runes
Anne Marchais-Roubelat’s chapter, ‘Flowing or frozen anticipation? Runes 
and the creativity of time’, brings to anticipation a critique of time in futures 
studies from the perspective of Heidegger’s concepts of frozen and flowing 
time. Rich in reference to research in organization studies, Marchais-Roubelat 
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also works her argument in relation to Old Norse poetry and Anglo-Saxon 
runes. If, she argues, the creativity alive in anticipation accesses time thought 
as fluid, complex and nontotalizing – as another option to time regarded as 
frozen, instrumental and measured – then an anticipatory organization should 
be able to loosen its rigid ontology and so find an attitude to uncertainty that 
is less terrifying and more fruitful. This aligns, we think, with the creative 
ontologies of innovation management and organization theory found, espe-
cially, in the work of Haridimos Tsoukas and Robert Chia (Tsoukas, 1998; 
Chia, 1999; Tsoukas and Chia, 2002) in particular and in Process Organization 
more generally (for example, Hernes, 2014). Yet Marchais-Roubelat’s chapter 
heads in the most creative directions by engaging with runes, discussing their 
multiple nature of divination, magic and narrative production; and, even fur-
ther, in regarding runes as event. This requires us to encounter the temporali-
ties of magic, divination (Marenko, 2014, 2015) and a narrative production 
that weaves them all simultaneously, heterogenously, in their full complexity 
and creativity. This is an ambitious argument and provides avenues for future 
research that are rich in their possibilities. We would be particularly inter-
ested to see where anticipation as event might lead us, following Marchais-
Roubelat’s insight into the divinatory power of runes as events. This would 
manifest also an encounter with Whitehead, especially through his conception 
of the ‘event’; and, indeed, Deleuze’s (1993, pp. 76–82) relating of this to 
Leibniz. Events have ‘actions, effects and influence’, do not have a sense of 
their own ‘function’ and become problematized by their relationship both to 
singularities (see: Deleuze, 1990a) to endurance (see: Stengers, 2011, pp. 185–
200; also, Donoghue in this volume, in relation to Bergson’s notion of ‘dura-
tion’). Stengers is clear about Whitehead’s atomism, especially as expressed in 
relation to his ontology of events. She quotes (Stengers, 2012, p. 188) from his 
Science and the Modern World (Whitehead, 1967a, p. 103) thus: ‘We must start 
with the event as the ultimate unit of natural occurrence. An event has to do 
with all that there is, and in particular with all other events.’ These are exciting 
times for an adventure into anticipation, as Stengers might say; and Marchais-
Roubelat plays a part in taking us there.
Hope
Nathaniel Barron’s chapter, ‘Ernst Bloch’s ontology of not-yet being: Intuiting 
the possibility of anticipation’s fulfilment’, is a closely argued interrogation of 
the ontology of hope that Bloch (2000) develops. Barron situates his examina-
tion in terms of developing a philosophy of design that, for him, has been lack-
ing a thorough engagement with Bloch, one of the twentieth century’s most 
accomplished philosophers of hope. Barron has a point. There is a phrase from 
the 1978 Nobel Laureate in Economics, Herbert Simon (1988, p. 67), which 
has become canon in design research: ‘Everyone designs who devises courses 
of action aimed at changing existing situations into preferred ones’ (emphasis 
added). Simon enhances the teleological attitude further: ‘Design, on the other 
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hand, is concerned with how things ought to be to be, with devising artifacts 
to attain goals’ (Simon, 1988, p. 69; emphasis added). Simon’s approach was 
influenced by his trust in methods and logics from the ‘hard sciences’ and the 
training he had in both the ‘Chicago School’ of economics and political science 
and as a consultant at the RAND Corporation (1951–76) (Huppatz, 2015; see 
also Bousbaci, 2008). Simon’s centrality to the expression of design as a science 
is without question, but for those of us with perspectives on design infused 
with qualitative, nonlinear, emotional or artful energies, Simon’s approach 
is limited (Celi and Morrison, 2017). It is notable that ‘rational choice’ in 
economics (Kay, 2013; Goodwin, 2014), ‘mutually assured destruction’ in 
military-political strategy (DeLanda, 1991) and a fact-oriented scientificity for 
design (Latour, 2008) have, since the 1990s, variously made way for more 
complex and qualitative approaches to their subjects, and more. The disrup-
tion that Barron offers, with Bloch’s help, to the type of logical design Simon 
promotes, is one that highlights the philosophical, political and ethical power 
that are intimated by Simon’s ‘ought’ and ‘preferred’. Barron’s is an ethics 
instantiated by the focus upon the action of self-developing self-critique: an 
ontological exposition of the ways and means that we may be. While Bloch’s 
work is remembered more for its phenomenological and political power than 
its ethics, when Barron’s Bloch comes towards creative practice such ethics 
(along with politics and ontologies of course) are foregrounded. For Barron, 
this is an approach that is activated by Bloch’s insight (1985, p. 147) into the 
‘darkness of the just-lived moment’ (Barron’s translation). This Barron works 
through the concept of what he calls Bloch’s ontology of ‘not-yet being’. 
That there is a need for being to be future oriented is attested to by both its 
inability to find an existence that can be consummated fully in the present and 
an emotional charge around this inability that manifests as this ‘darkness of the 
just-lived moment’. This is an extremely important issue for Barron, leading 
him to stress its ramifications as an imperative: anticipation must take seriously 
Bloch’s insight that a not-yet being has potential for future actualization, for 
its (anticipation’s) ontological promise to be fulfilled. Bloch and Barron pro-
vide another angle on the contemporary’s perspective on present darkness that 
Brassett and O’Reilly develop in Chapter 10; and the hope, the light in the 
darkness, however minuscule, that lures anticipation on its creative journey. 
(Barron does this in relation to a critique of Poli’s readings of Bloch, which 
we have already intimated. We will leave this for you to discover.) For us, 
this takes Bloch away from a recognizable – and maybe simplistic – dialectical 
motor where negation (a lack) is resolved through synthesis with what was 
negated. Both the untimely and the contemporary do not negate, theirs is not 
a nihilist moment but a creative one: the future alive in anticipation is that 
the not-yet is also a becoming. (This becoming, this ongoing transformation 
of existence into something more, something exceeding itself, is apparent not 
only here but in the next chapter too.) Barron positions Bloch’s work within 
the anticipatory context of ‘utopia’, re-reading the history of philosophy and 
in particular concepts of ‘creativity’ and ‘causality’, in terms of anticipation. 
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The problem of anticipating a future creatively, argues Barron, is always one 
of an incapacity for ‘beginnings’. Unfortunately, the art of revealing possi-
bilities for renewal is all too often rendered insensible to us by powers which 
seek to perpetuate an idea of the eternality of the content of the present. It is 
capitalism’s blind spot that Barron teases out: the invisible sensible. Indeed we 
might argue that it is this blind spot which disables neoliberal capital to see an 
‘outside’ future, a utopos, that could predict anything other than ‘neoliberalism 
2.0’ as the future of algorithms that talk to each other – smart cities, big data 
healthcare, driverless cars – because they already know who we are and what 
we will become. We wonder whether sensible presentation of Utopia is pos-
sible in forms of foresight delivered as scenarios and PowerPoint presentations; 
or whether the blind spot of corporate futurism lies in the digital imagination 
of Redmond and Cupertino.
Rules
In ‘Are scenarios creative? Questioning movement and innovation in antici-
pation practices’, Fabrice Roubelat uses his expertise in scenario planning – as 
a scholar and practitioner – to engage anticipation and creativity to imag-
ine innovation differently. By developing an argument around the value of 
movement and action in futures thinking and practice, he cautions scenario 
designers not to think that their creative products are immutable and always 
relevant; similar to the famous line from Prussian field marshal Helmuth von 
Moltke (1800–1891) – that no plan survives the first encounter with the 
enemy. Roubelat’s position aligns with a tendency in innovation manage-
ment studies over the last 25–30 years or so that values a lithe and dynamic 
approach to organizational design, strategy and market orientation: notably 
the ‘ambidextrous organization’ (Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996); process 
ontologies (Tsoukas, 1998; Chia, 1999; Tsoukas and Chia, 2002; Hernes, 
2014) and complexity (Brassett, 2015); but also, more recent trends in design 
thinking (two of the most influential texts are: Brown, 2009; Martin, 2009). 
But Roubelat is able to bring together thinking from Platonist philosopher 
Plutarch, philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn and scenario developer 
Herman Kahn (among others) in developing his perspective. Yet, this chapter 
is not as straightforward as it may seem, for Roubelat finds that his proposition 
of ‘moving scenarios’ shows that Kuhn’s conception of scientific paradigms 
is not as robust as its reputation. The relation between a set of dynamic and 
complex scenarios and the rule-sets, practices and interests that manifest it 
provides a landscape that is neither as homogenous nor as recognizable as a 
paradigm. This is exacerbated even further, when we consider the push for a 
‘decolonized’ account of the power of scientific relationality of the type advo-
cated by, for example, philosopher of science Arun Bala (2006). The complex 
topology of interconnected, dialogic communities around the globe, now and 
throughout history, provides a space for thinking scenarios in a much less 
simplistic way. Even more, Roubelat’s positioning of Anticipation is not so 
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supportive as that of many of us in this volume: he is wary (rightly so in our 
opinion) of its teleological nature, but still finds useful its imaginative tenden-
cies. So, while some of us have excitedly embraced the novelty of the practice 
of anticipation in relation to futures studies, Roubelat’s steady location of it 
within a fairly well-recognized futures process as scenario design is a welcome 
critical contextualization.
Stitching
John O’Reilly’s chapter is concerned with practice and its manifestations across 
research practice, creative practice, philosophical practice and pedagogical 
practice. These are situated between two separate events: NASA’s develop-
ment of the spacesuit for astronauts in the late 1950s and early 1960s and the 
instantiation of Black Quantum Futurism in 2015. Both involve obfuscated, 
obliviated or simply minoritarian discourses and practices in creative prod-
uct development and creative activism. Encountering innovation processes, 
structures and deployments of power/knowledge and creative ontologies of 
anticipation, O’Reilly makes a case for the courage it takes to think and act 
otherwise than normal. To do this he highlights an observation by Argentinian 
Walter Miller, who has spent the last 30 years exploring ways to unpick 
the modern/colonial system and develop a thinking and politics of justice. 
In Miller’s book (2011) The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, 
Decolonial Options, he writes that: ‘The illusion that Western Civilization could 
create the problem and solve it is facing its limits’ (Miller, 2011, p. 282). It is 
a hopeful thought, though it will not be easy, because as Malcolm McLaren, 
innovation manager of Punk, realized (‘quoting’ the Situationists): ‘capitalism 
sells our boredom back to us’. The capitalism engendered in the west (though 
currently with many characteristics) is particularly adept at folding its edgy – 
and possibly destructive – outsides back into the middle to energize its own 
creative approaches to surplus value production. A monomaniacal monopo-
lization of capital will simply increase entropy unless the system is opened to 
the creative outsides (Serres, 1982). Deleuze and Guattari (1984, 1988) call this 
‘schizophrenization’. Just as the oil companies broke the planet notwithstand-
ing their scenario and foresight work (however far they thought the unthink-
able), there are corporations willing to capitalize our futures and sell them back 
to us through the micro targeting offered by abilities to manage large data sets. 
This ‘corporate imagination’ controls the intellectual, political and commercial 
currency of the future unless we can think and act otherwise, ‘other-wise’ as 
O’Reilly puts it. He writes:
In the terms of this chapter, we might say that anticipation – as a form of 
creative researching – is also the capacity to anticipate beyond the given 
discourses of needs. Anticipation as research is always excessive. In exceed-
ing and overflowing the given epistemologies the hyphen of the Other-
wise is an artefact created by our research, and this hyphen which connects 
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and separates, begins to anticipate the kind of discipline anticipation might 
need to engage with if it is to stay open to the Otherness of the future.
As well as the ‘others’ in the present.
Love
Jamie Brassett uses the creative ontologies of anticipation, in the interleaving 
contexts of love and friendship, to drive a critique of the future’s collusion with 
war. His chapter ‘For a creative ontology of the future: an ode to love’ inter-
rogates Robert Rosen’s speculative, relational biology in conjunction with 
Roman poet, scientist and philosopher Lucretius’s creative atomist ontology. 
For Lucretius (2007), life is a materialization of love and for Rosen (1991, 
2000, 2012) anticipation is one of the key characteristics of life. Why, Brassett 
contends, is much forward planning infused with strategy, a term of war? 
Lucretius, on the other hand, looks to the creative, generative power of love. 
And philosopher Michel Serres (1977), in his critical evaluation of Lucretius’s 
work as a forerunner of more contemporary nondeterministic dynamics and 
negentropic complexity, argues the same. The concern then becomes: how 
might future-oriented work characterize itself in relation to love not war? 
Serres and Lucretius provide a way out of the fœdus fati, the atomic fall to death 
in which strategy is implicated, through the fœdera naturae, the natural treaties 
of a swerved, local, relational, creative universe. For Brassett, this is delivered 
– at least partially – through anticipation and the relational ontologies it articu-
lates, both at its origin and in its contemporary possibilities. The sense of life, 
creative and loving, that we find in Lucretius encounters Rosen’s relational 
biology of life: one that is always overflowing and exceeding the basic elements 
to which much contemporary physics seeks to reduce it. Serres is particularly 
vehement in locating identity and homogeneity with death and entropic stag-
nation; we might also require similar in ensuring anticipation (as an act and a 
developing disciplinary studies) a creative, loving future.
Emission
Lucy Kimbell manages to embody many different kinds of expertise: designer, 
artist, Science and Technology Studies scholar, social design expert and one of 
today’s key developers of designing for policy. Kimbell brings both a highly 
affective perspective and rigorously argued examination of the ways in which 
an anticipatory art and design can be thought and practised. Her chapter, 
‘Inventive devices and public issues: The Air Pollution Toile’, centres on her 
speculatively designed wallpaper toile that is simultaneously haunting and 
provocative. With patterns that change in relation to the various particulates 
of our polluted, metropolitan living, Kimbell’s wallpaper locates itself within 
those design and design studies traditions that deliver both critical commen-
tary on contemporary concerns and speculative accounts of possible action 
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(for example: Dunne and Raby, 2013; Yelavich and Adams, 2014). Kimbell 
weaves the manifold pragmatics and critiques of her positioning into a text 
shot through with capacities for affecting and being affected that are crucial 
components of any relational ontology. While Kimbell’s focus is turned else-
where, with this mention of ‘relational ontology’ we (Jamie and John) see 
the relationality of the theoretical biology of Robert Rosen (who, as noted 
already, is a key figure in anticipation studies), as well as a brief mention of 
his tutor and mentor, Nicolas Rashevsky (1899–1972) who coined the term 
‘relational biology’ and from whom Rosen took up the antireductionist cause 
(Nadin, 2010, 2011). It is worth noting here, briefly, that a relational ontol-
ogy also suffuses the metaphysics and ethics of Baruch Spinoza (1996). We 
have investigated the ways in which Spinoza’s ontology might be brought to 
futures and design (Brassett and O’Reilly, 2015; Brassett, 2016), ethics and 
social design (Brassett, 2018). We wonder, here, how these modes of thought 
may extend from and into Kimbell’s toile. An intriguing aspect of Spinoza’s 
ethics, especially for those of us involved in design and the arts is the dissolu-
tion of a body from a bounded entity to one that is predicated on its relations; 
those articulated as affecting and being affected. It is clear, for us, that Kimbell’s 
toile is expressed both as a set of relations – pollution and its impacts; patterns 
and their mirroring in bodies and environments; and as a complex association 
of affects – between mothers and daughters, various business interests (e.g. 
fossil fuels, cigarettes) and the domestic interior, political discourses and direct 
action. It is also important, that Kimbell’s work (the toile and its positioning 
here, in this book) is simultaneously, but not unambiguously – and therefore 
neither exhausted in any of these tendencies nor totalizing of all of them – a 
pragmatic, speculative and critical act of design.
Pataphysics
A tendency to ambiguity is important for anticipation scholar Mihai Nadin 
(2010, p. 26), who – citing Stephen Kercel (2007) – writes that ‘ambiguity is 
an observable feature of complexity’, with the consequence that anticipation is 
nothing if not complex and ambiguous. Our final chapter works through com-
plexity, ambiguity and anticipation through the work of philosophical prank-
ster Alfred Jarry (1873–1907) and his intellectual contribution of ’Pataphysics. 
Author Derek Hales has been a leading thinker in this field for a number of 
years. In addition, Hales is also an important proponent of ‘design fictions’ 
(Hales, 2013) and their relation to ‘speculative design’. Informed by all of these 
is Hales’s innovation practice especially in relation to regional development and 
his disciplinary field of architecture. In this chapter, ‘The anticipatory power of 
the objectile’, Hales takes the reader through the paradoxical theory and practice 
of ‘anticipatory plagiarism’ as it is played out in the work of various archi-
tects, philosophers and mathematicians and in relation to ’Pataphysics. This is 
defined as the ‘science of imaginary solutions, which symbolically attributes the 
properties of objects, described by their virtuality, to their lineaments’ (Jarry, 
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1965, p. 145); furthermore, ’pataphysics stands in the same relation to meta-
physics as metaphysics does to physics. Taught philosophy by Henri Bergson 
and with an ability to shock the bourgeoisie – which renowned ’Pataphysician 
Andrew Hugill (2015, p. 3) aligns with a possible etymology of the term: épata-
physique, with épater being ‘to shock’ in French and the omitted ‘e’ leading to 
the preceding apostrophe – Jarry is probably most well-known for his play Ubu 
Roi (1968). There are a number of lines to take from this definition by Jarry. 
Thinking ‘lineaments’ as ‘contours’ we have some notions of Riemannian 
curved space – a mathematics that was important and popular as the nineteenth 
became the twentieth century. With ‘virtuality’, a gesture to Bergson; and, 
with a science characterized as ‘imaginary’, we confront many of the concerns 
of the other chapters in this book. Hales also re-examines the concept of the 
‘objectile’ (see also: Hales, 2015). For Hales, the concept of the ‘objectile’ as 
developed by Gilles Deleuze (1993) regards an object not in any entirety but 
as a voyaging, processing of matter, a matter-flow (Hales, 2015). It therefore 
serves as a powerful pataphysical act: a throwing-out or throwing-up of thing-
ness. This is, of course, also an act of drawing down the future into the present, 
as if it were the cup of a huge catapult machine only to be released to hurtle 
off again, goodness knows where. Hales brings to bear on such an anticipatory 
modelling two further concepts worth comment: anticipatory plagiarism and 
architectural fictions. These necessarily intertwine, but for brevity we can say 
that anticipatory plagiarism is the present’s plagiarizing of future work. While 
couched in utterly pataphysical terms, this is also as good a definition of antici-
pation as one could have. Architectural fictions, strange, speculative acts that 
are creating a present with the future in, today, that will offer a future that is 
therefore already plagiarized. Hales manages this in a form of creative theory 
writing that is as awe inspiring and joyfully playful as any pataphysical text.
Mode
To close, there is the chapter by us, Jamie Brassett and John O’Reilly, first 
published in French, in the journal Prospective et Stratégie (Brassett and O’Reilly, 
2018b). The chapter presented here is an amended and expanded English ver-
sion of that article. We thank the General Editor of Prospective et Stratégie for per-
mission to publish this version here. Now titled ‘2078/1978. Anticipation and 
the Contemporary’, this chapter brings to anticipation a philosophical exami-
nation of the concept of ‘the contemporary (person)’ by Giorgio Agamben 
(2008) – itself informed by Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1997) development of the 
‘untimely’. Agamben positions the contemporary person in a space situated 
both inside and outside the present and is regarded by both philosophers as a 
positioning that demands courage. In so doing, the contemporary stance allows 
the contemporary person to create a new present as a consequence of this posi-
tion providing a view on the present’s darkest moments. If this needs courage, 
we argue, so does anticipation. For it, too, demands that we adopt a position 
inside and outside the present in order to allow the future in and thus to make 
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it anew. Such a positioning is mirrored in some futures work; notably, Riel 
Miller’s (2011) urge to adopt a ‘scenaric stance’, which also requires a move 
away from an epistemological situation (searching for meanings) towards an 
ontological one (thinking and practising beings and becomings). As we have 
discussed earlier in this introduction, the work of Roberto Poli (2010b, 2011, 
2017) has also become important in developing anticipation studies in recent 
years. For Poli, an anticipatory stance requires a certain ‘irrelevance’, a step 
outside of current norms to be able to get a perspective on the future. This 
is exactly the same word as Agamben uses to characterize the contemporary: 
‘irrelevance’. We develop an argument that positions untimely, contempo-
rary and anticipatory in proximity to each other. In doing this, we overturn 
some thoughts and practices that we do not have time to cultivate, eager as 
we are to keep focus upon our main topics of enquiry. Chief amongst these 
is Whitehead’s conception of ‘speculative’ philosophy. While this practice/
concept has been prominent in recent years – Brassett (2016, p. 163) notes, 
among a variety of disciplines: ‘speculative design’ (also discussed by Hales and 
practised by Kimbell in this volume), ‘speculative history’, ‘speculative real-
ism’ – a thorough investigation of the knot resulting from twining together 
Whitehead’s speculative philosophy, anticipation studies and creative ontolo-
gies would be insightful future research.
Immediate existence (whenever that may be)
What each of these essays compose is a different way of styling the future 
(Brassett and O’Reilly, 2015) that has not already been predicted; with these 
styles generating atmosphere, as we noted above. Anticipation thought this 
way is a singular, creative and flourishing act; otherwise the future merely 
comes already prefabbed. Organization scholar Barbara Czarniawska writes in 
‘The Style and the Stylists of Organization Theory’ (2005, p. 240):
we speak of ‘texts lacking style’ that can be best described as compilations 
of words and phrases rather than as ‘the work on the words’. Style is the 
writer’s awareness of being engaged in writing, incorporated into the text 
itself (as opposed to lack of such awareness, but also to self-reflective or 
meta-reflexive texts).
Anticipation that truly engages in the unknown-unknown needs to create a 
different language with which to translate the future: to style the future in a 
way for the present, as we anticipated a few years ago (Brassett and O’Reilly, 
2015). The different styles of each chapter are also – literally, cognitively, fash-
ionably – modes of anticipation, modes of anticipation as ontological trans-
formation: Picturing; Runes; Hope; Rules; Stitching; Love; Emission; Pataphysics; 
Mode. As much as each chapter is a situated engagement with the concept and 
practices of anticipation, we hope the reader will register theses different modes 
of anticipation. Anticipation is the capacity of futures studies for opening up to 
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the multiple modes of future becoming, beyond the corporate ‘unreal estate of 
the future’, to making futures that are creative, ethical and lovely.
The timelines of this book as an anticipated work in all our futures are 
drawn back to the knots of our meetings in presents now past. Or they form 
as separate strands of practice, highlighting a manifold of anticipations that 
have communicated sometimes strongly, other times not, and every place in-
between. This has been a fascinating process into and out of anticipation in 
thought and practice. George Orwell, in Nineteen Eighty-Four, tells us that 
‘[t]he best books are the books that tell you what you know already’; these 
books, like algorithms, have already predicted us. But life cannot be reduced 
to or represented by an algorithm (Nadin, 2011). If this is what the best is, then 
we are hoping that this book on anticipation will become one of the worst.
Notes
1 We should note that futures scholar, Marcus Bussey (2013, 2017), engages with a philo-
sophical focus very much in alignment with many of ours in this volume.
2 Futures and education scholar Keri Facer (2018) uses Whitehead’s (1968, pp. 171–174) 
position on the future-focused role of the university to critique its neoliberalization 
(among other things) – thus bringing an important political aspect to play in issues 
around higher education and the future.
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